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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
 Equality Ohio is a non-profit organization seeking to achieve fair 
treatment and equal opportunity for all Ohioans, regardless of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity or expression.  
 A proud member of the Equality Federation, which supports state 
members nation-wide (including Michigan), Equality Ohio works closely 
with legislators and local communities to ensure that policy and law in Ohio 
are fully inclusive of LGBTQ people. In particular, Equality Ohio seeks to 
guarantee the rights of transgender persons. For example, last year Equality 
Ohio worked closely with Cleveland City Council to pass Ordinance 1446, 
removing discriminatory language from Cleveland’s code and allowing 
transgender Clevelanders and visitors to have the dignity of using the restroom 
matching their gender identity. In addition, the organization is currently 
working with a bi-partisan group of Ohio legislators to pass a bill ending 
discrimination in employment on the basis of gender identity. 
                                                 
1  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(2), counsel for 
amicus curiae certifies that all parties have consented to the filing of this 
brief. Pursuant to Rule 29(a)(4)(E), counsel certifies that no party’s counsel 
have authored this brief in whole or in part;  that no party or party’s counsel 
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this 
brief; and that no person — other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its 
counsel — has contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or 
submitting this brief.  
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 Equality Ohio has a clear interest in this matter. Should the district court 
opinion stand, transgender persons in Ohio would be negatively affected in 
several ways. In particular, the legal assertion that an employer can fire a 
person based solely on their gender identity — and do so with impunity, 
despite the clear language of Title VII — is offensive and damaging to many 
a transgender Ohioans.    
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Title VII’s plain language bars discharge of “any individual” — 
whether transgender or not — “because of such individual’s . . . sex.” It 
applies whenever employers take gender into account in making employment 
decisions. It is undisputed that the employer in this case based his decision to 
terminate Ms. Stephens solely on sex-based considerations. To be sure, he 
could have terminated Ms. Stephens for a wide array of reasons — tardiness, 
failure to perform, disciplinary issues — or for no reason at all. Under those 
circumstances, such termination — even of a transgender person — would not 
be “because of such individual’s sex.” But that is not the case here. Here, the 
only reasons provided by the employer were all related, directly and 
unequivocally, to Ms. Stephen’s sex. Accordingly, Title VII applies, and the 
discharge should be held unlawful.  
      Case: 16-2424     Document: 62     Filed: 04/26/2017     Page: 10
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 This argument proceeds in three parts. First, we assert that Title VII 
directly applies in this matter. More specifically, we explain why 
discrimination against Ms. Stephens, solely because of her transsexual 
identity, is discrimination “based on sex” and is therefore unlawful under Title 
VII.  
 Second, and consequently, we explain why the district court erred in its 
analysis of this issue. We review the assertions made by the district court, 
according to which transgender persons are not protected under Title VII, and 
show why they were made in error according to Sixth Circuit law. 
 Finally, we explain why the result we reached is desirable in terms of 
policy. We explain that recognizing “sex discrimination” in the transgender 
context is a natural, reasonable interpretation of Title VII. We review both the 
statute’s legislative history and subsequent legal developments pertaining to 
sexual minorities and conclude that the result sought here — the protection of 
transgender persons at work — is both desired and inevitable.   
 Equality Ohio limits its argument here to the Title VII issues. It does 
not consider RFRA. With that, Equality Ohio is of the opinion that Title VII 
is a “super statute,” as noted by Professor Eskridge. 2  Accordingly, no 
                                                 
2  William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Farejohn, Super Statutes, 50 Duke 
L.J. 1215, 1237 (2001) (“the Civil Rights Act is a proven super-statute 
because it embodies a great principle (antidiscrimination), was adopted after 
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employer — whether sued by the Federal Government or otherwise — should 
be able to overcome its formidable apparatus simply by invoking RFRA. Title 
VII, now over half a century in age, was not designed to be overturned each 
time an employer’s religious beliefs (genuine or newly-found) are brought to 
the fore.  
ARGUMENT 
 
I. Title VII Applies in This Matter Since the Employer 
 Discriminated Against Stephens “Because of . . . Sex.” 
 
 A.  Title VII Prohibits Employers from Relying on Sex-Based  
  Considerations to Make Employment Decisions, Except  
  Where Doing so Constitutes a Bona Fide Occupational  
  Qualification. 
 
Title VII provides that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to . . . discharge [or otherwise discriminate against] any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 
2(a)(1).  The word any is important here because it means that Title VII’s anti-
discrimination mandate covers any individual, including a transgender person, 
                                                 
an intense political struggle and normative debate and has over the years 
entrenched its norm into American public life, and has pervasively affected 
federal statutes and constitutional law. . . . Title VII's principle has been 
debated, honed, and strengthened through an ongoing give-and-take among 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. . . . [T]he Civil Rights Act's 
evolution has repeatedly been influenced by social movement ideas and 
popular pressure on the political process.”). 
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as long that person has been the victim of discrimination because of his or her 
sex.  See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] label, 
such as “transsexual,” is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the 
victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-
conformity.”).3  
This Court has long recognized that Title VII requires that sex must be 
an “irrelevant factor[] in employment opportunity.”  Jacobs v. Martin Sweets, 
                                                 
3  The terms “transgender” and “transsexual” are used interchangeably 
throughout this brief as the former term encompasses the latter.  According 
to the American Psychological Association, the term transgender is an 
“umbrella term” and may include a variety of individuals whose gender 
identity or expression transgress binary conceptions of gender.  See “What 
Does Gender Mean?” American Psychological Association, 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx; see also Jillian Todd 
Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the Supreme Court: What Is 
the “Plain Meaning” of “Sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 
18 Temp. Pol & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 573, 589 (2009) (explaining that 
“transgender” may “denote transsexuals, transvestites, crossdressers, and 
anyone else whose gender identity or gender expression varies from the 
dimorphic norm”).   
 The term “transsexual” refers specifically “to people whose gender 
identity is different from their assigned sex [and who] [o]ften . . . alter or 
wish to alter their bodies through hormones, surgery, and other means to 
make their bodies as congruent as possible with their gender identities.” 
“What Does Gender Mean?,” American Psychological Association, 
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx.     
 Ms. Stephens was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder and “was 
diagnosed as a transsexual,” Opinion & Order, R.76, PageID#2188-10, 
meaning, according to the authorities cited, that she is also considered to be 
transgender. 
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Co., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1987) (“In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple 
but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are 
not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”).4   
Accordingly, Title VII prohibits employers from relying on sex-based 
considerations in making employment decisions.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 
U.S. at 241 (explaining that by using the phrase “because of sex” in Title VII, 
“Congress meant [only] to obligate . . . [plaintiffs] to prove that the employer 
relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its [employment-related] 
decision”).   In this matter, the record is unmistakably clear that the 
employer’s decision to fire Ms. Stephens because she is transgender included 
sex-based consideration and runs afoul of Title VII.  
B. Discrimination Because of an Individual’s Gender Identity Is 
  Actionable Under Title VII Because It Is Motivated by Sex- 
  Based Considerations. 
 
 1. The meaning of “because of sex” has evolved over time. 
 
It is unclear exactly what Congress intended the term “sex” to mean 
under Title VII. Legislative history on the matter is sparse. See Meritor Sav. 
                                                 
4  The Court recognized “the special context of affirmative action” and 
the statutory defense of bona fide occupational qualification as exceptions to 
the rule.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 & n.3, 244. 
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Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (noting that there is “little 
legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against 
discrimination based on “sex”). The prohibition against sex discrimination 
was added one day before Congress voted on Title VII, and it is commonly 
understood that the amendment was a last-ditch effort to scuttle the bill. See, 
e.g., Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 519 (D. Conn. 
2016) (discussing the history of the “sex” amendment to Title VII as well as 
early judicial treatment of Title VII and transgender identity); see also 
Matthew W. Green, Jr., Same-Sex and Immutable Traits: Why Obergefell v. 
Hodges Clears a Path to Protecting Gay and Lesbian Employees from 
Workplace Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 J. Gender, Race & Justice 1, 
19-20 (2017) (discussing legislative history of “sex” amendment). 
Courts have long debated what Congress intended by including “sex” 
among Title VII’s protected traits, particularly when addressing claims by 
transgender employees.  For instance, as this Court explained in Smith, 378 
F.3d 566, ostensibly relying on the plain language of the term “sex” and 
Congressional intent, some early courts rejected claims by transgender 
plaintiffs, contending that by including sex in Title VII Congress intended 
only to bar discrimination based on an individual’s anatomical or biological 
sex.  See id. at 573; see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 
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1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that “sex” as used in Title VII means “no more 
than biological male or biological female”). Some early courts considered 
transgender discrimination as relating more to an individual’s gender than to 
his or her sex and thus outside of Title VII’s protection.  See Smith, 378 F.3d 
at 572-73.5 
 As this Court has recognized, the law in this area significantly shifted 
after Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that sex and gender must be 
treated the same for purposes of Title VII. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573.  Thus, 
discrimination because of the failure to act consistent with certain gender 
norms associated with one’s sex is actionable discrimination under the statute.  
Moreover, sex-stereotyping on the basis of an individual’s gender non-
conforming behavior is unlawful under Title VII, regardless of whether the 
basis for that behavior is the individual’s transsexualism. See id. at 574-75. 
  
                                                 
5  The American Psychological Association distinguishes sex from 
gender.  See “What Is the Difference Between Sex and Gender?,” American 
Psychological Association, http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.aspx 
(“Sex is assigned at birth, refers to one’s biological status as either male or 
female, and is associated primarily with physical attributes such as external 
and internal anatomy. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, 
behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate 
for boys and men or girls and women.”). 
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 2. Discrimination against Ms. Stephens because of her  
   transsexual identity is unlawful under Title VII. 
    
 Transsexual persons like Ms. Stephens are not limited to proving sex 
discrimination by way of gender nonconformity.  Rather, sex stereotyping 
aside, discrimination because an individual is transsexual is necessarily 
discrimination because of that individual’s sex because it is grounded in sex-
based considerations. 
 As explained, an individual is considered transgender because of the 
mismatch between gender identity and anatomy. Accordingly, when 
discrimination occurs because an individual is transgender, that 
discrimination is not only grounded in the failure of the individual to conform 
to gender norms concerning how men and women should dress, behave or 
identify, but is motivated in part by the sex of the individual.  The Ninth 
Circuit recognized the inextricable link between transsexualism and sex in 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).  In Schwenk, a 
transgender inmate alleged a violation of the Gender Motivated Violence Act 
(GMVA) after being sexually assaulted by a prison guard. See id. at 1193-95. 
The court was faced with the issue of whether gender was a motivating factor 
in the attack, and it looked to Title VII case law to define the term “gender.” 
See id. at 1201.  Consistent with the discussion set forth earlier in this brief, 
the court explained that early courts addressing the issue considered sex and 
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gender to be distinct concepts, with Title VII barring discrimination because 
of the former but not on the latter. See id.   
 Price Waterhouse, of course, collapsed these concepts for purposes of 
Title VII.  The Ninth Circuit went on to explain that “[w]hat matters, for 
purposes of . . . Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the 
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here for 
example, the perpetrator's [discriminatory] actions stem from [a belief] that . 
. . the [transsexual] victim was a man who ‘failed to act like’ one.” Id. at 1202. 
Thus, discrimination against a transsexual individual is motivated by both sex 
and gender.  Title VII requires only that sex be a motivating factor in an 
adverse employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). It does not have to be 
the sole or exclusive factor.  Accordingly, there is no need to rely on gender 
discrimination or sex stereotyping where an individual shows that sex-based 
considerations underlay the adverse action.  In the instant case, for instance, 
Aimee Stephens informed the employer that she had been diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder and was transsexual. Opinion & Order, R.76, 
PageID#2188-10. Discrimination against her on that basis would be motivated 
at least in part because of her sex. 
Moreover, the employer also impermissibly relied on sex-based 
considerations when he terminated Ms. Stephens because she notified him that 
      Case: 16-2424     Document: 62     Filed: 04/26/2017     Page: 18
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as part of her transition from male to female, she would begin to dress for 
work consistent with the sex with which she identifies: female.  The employer 
admitted as much when he argued before the district court that RFRA provides 
a defense to this lawsuit.  Describing the employer’s religious beliefs 
concerning sex, the district court explained that  
[the employer] believes “that the Bible teachers that God creates people 
 male or female” . . . [and] . . . “that people should not deny or attempt 
 to change their sex.” [The employer] believes that he “would be 
 violating God’s commands if [he] were to permit one of the [Funeral 
 Home’s] funeral directors to deny their sex while acting as a 
 representative of [the Funeral Home] . . . [and] “that it is wrong from a 
 biological male to deny his sex by dressing as a woman.” 
  
Opinion & Order, R.76, PageID#2194-16 through 17 (citations omitted). 
The aforementioned shows an inextricable link between Ms. Stephens’s 
sex and the employer’s decision to fire her.  In the employer’s own words, he 
believes that Aimee Stephens’s sex is “immutable” and that because of that 
immutable sex (which the employer perceived to be male), she was supposed 
to dress, behave and identify consistent with the anatomy with which she was 
born.  To permit Ms. Stephens to do otherwise, according to the employer, 
would signify that he agrees with the idea that Ms. Stephens’s “sex is a 
changeable social construct rather than an immutable God-given gift.” Id. at 
17. To be sure, the employer’s views implicate stereotypical notions of how 
“real men” should identify or present themselves in the workplace.  However, 
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by the employer’s admission, Ms. Stephens’s sex necessarily factored into his 
decision to fire her.   
The employer claims that he would not have terminated Ms. Stephens 
had she dressed in female attire only when not at work. This claim does not 
change the sex-based considerations underlying her discharge.  The employer 
considered Ms. Stephens to be male, a factor he admits he took into account 
in terminating her employment.  Accordingly, her sex motivated his adverse 
action.  Title VII requires no more. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 
(explaining that by using the phrase because of sex in Title VII, “Congress 
meant [only] to obligate . . . [plaintiffs] to prove that the employer relied upon 
sex-based considerations in coming to its [employment-related] decision); 
Jacobs, 550 F.2d at 370 (explaining that Title VII requires that sex be 
irrelevant with regard to “employment opportunity”).  Whether because of her 
transsexual identity or the employer’s views regarding how Ms. Stephens 
should dress because of her anatomy at birth, sex-considerations motivated 
her discharge. 
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II. The District Court Erred in Holding That Title VII Protection Does 
 Not Apply when the Decision to Terminate Is Based on 
 Transgender Status or Gender Identity. 
 
A.  The District Court Erred in Failing to Find That Ms. 
 Stephens Was a Member of a Protected Class for Purposes 
 of the Claim of Transgender Status Discrimination. 
 
The EEOC’s main argument in this matter was that the Funeral Home’s 
decision to terminate Stephens “because Stephens is a transgender” was 
“motivated by sex-based considerations” and therefore “an unlawful 
employment practice” under Title VII. Compl. ¶ 15, R.1, PageID#4. The 
district court denied that argument:6 “like sexual orientation, transgender or 
transsexual status is currently not a protected class under Title VII.” Order 
Denying MTD, R.13, PageID#188; see also Opinion & Order, R.76, 
PageID#2180 (“This Court previously rejected the EEOC’s position that it 
stated a Title VII claim by virtue of alleging that Stephens’s termination was 
due to transgender status or gender identity — because those are not protected 
classes.”). 
But this assertion is in error. This Court has held, at least twice, that 
transgender persons are protected under Title VII.  
                                                 
6 The district court did accept, however, the EEOC’s alternative claim 
regarding gender non-conforming behavior. We agree with this result, as 
well with other Briefs’ analyses supporting it.  
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First, in Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), this Court 
reviewed the case of a male firefighter who worked for seven years for the 
City without an incident. Then, after being diagnosed with a Gender Identity 
Disorder (GID), he began “‘expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-
time basis.’” Id. at 568. He was fired and brought claim under Title VII. The 
district court dismissed his claim. This Court reversed, noting:  
Smith is a member of a protected class. His complaint 
asserts that he is a male with Gender Identity Disorder, and Title 
VII prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” protects 
men as well as women. The complaint also alleges both that Smith 
was qualified for the position in question – he would have been a 
lieutenant in the Fire Department for seven years without any 
negative incidents – and that he would not have been treated 
differently, on account of his non-masculine behavior and GID, 
had he been a woman instead of a man.   
 
Id. at 570 (emphasis added; citation omitted).   
 
The resemblance to this case is striking. Here, too, Stephens worked for 
nearly six years, Opinion & Order, R.76, PageID#2187, without any negative 
incidents. Here, too, Stephens had a Gender Identity Disorder Id., PageID# 
2188. Here, too, she was treated differently solely on the account of her GID 
and her intention — expressed in a letter, never to be carried out — to express 
herself, by “liv[ing] and work[ing] full-time,” as a woman. Id. Surely, 
Stephens — like Smith — is a member of a protected class.  
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    A year following Smith, in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 
(6th Cir. 2005), this Court again confirmed that transgender persons are 
protected under Title VII. In Barnes, this Court examined the case of a police 
officer who “was living as a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual.” Id. at 
733. Hired in 1981 as a man, Barnes successfully passed a promotional test 
for sergeant seven years later. Id. Still, he was denied the promotion, among 
other things, “for lack of ‘command presence.’” Id. at 734. Barnes filed a Title 
VII claim against the City, and the jury awarded him more than $800,000, 
including compensatory damages, front pay, back pay, and attorneys fees. The 
City appealed to this Court. This Court affirmed. 
Much like the district court here, the City in that case claimed that 
Barnes “was not a member of protected class.” Id. at 736.  This Court denied 
that claim:  
Smith . . . instructs that the City’s claim that Barnes was 
 not a member of a protected class lacks merit. In Smith, 
 this court held that the district court erred in granting a 
 motion to dismiss by holding that transsexuals, as a class, 
 are not entitled to Title VII protection, stating: . . . “a label, 
 such as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination 
 claim where the victim has suffered discrimination 
 because of his or her gender non-conformity.” 
 
Id. at 737 (citation omitted).  
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Again, the resemblance to this case is uncanny. Here, it is clear that the 
district court — relying on a gender-orientation case rather than a transgender 
case7 — erred in his analysis.  
 B.  The District Court Erred by Posing the Wrong Question. 
 
In addition to being wrong on the protection granted to transgender 
persons in this Circuit, the district court was also wrong in the question it 
posed for review.  
The district court dismissed the EEOC’s claim that the termination of 
Ms. Stephens’s employment was motivated by sex-based characteristics. 
Relying on questionable precedent,8 the lower court held that “transgender or 
                                                 
7  The district court relied on Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Cir., 453 F.3d 757 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discrimination 
acts under Title VII”). First, Vickers is not a transgender case, and this Court 
has direct law on the issue. There was, therefore, no need to invoke Vickers in 
the first place. Second, Vickers is more than a decade old, and perhaps should 
be re-evaluated in light of recent cases. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry); 
and Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty College of Indiana, No. 115-1720, 2017 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5839 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2017) (en banc) (Title VII applies to sexual 
orientation).  
8  The district court cited a case from this Court involving a claim of 
sexual orientation discrimination, Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 
(6th Cir. 2006), and a transsexual discrimination case from the Tenth Circuit, 
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). Obviously, 
Vickers dealt with a different issue. Etsitty relies on a line of cases including 
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984), which have 
been undercut by Price Waterhouse. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 
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transsexual status is currently not a protected class under Title VII.” Opinion, 
R.13, PageID#188-89. In framing the issue that way, the district court 
effectively carved transgender persons out from the protections of Title VII, 
something that this Court has already criticized in both Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004), and Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 
(6th Cir. 2005). As those cases clearly state, transgender individuals are 
entitled to Title VII’s protection against sex discrimination. 
The analysis should begin with the language of the statute itself. 
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008). Here, the plain 
language of the statute does not permit the interpretation given it by the Etsitty 
line of cases. Section 703 of Title VII prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against “any individual  . . .  because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There 
is no exemption or exception anywhere in the statute for transgender 
individuals. Like all other individuals, they are protected from discrimination 
                                                 
1201 (9th Cir. 2000); Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 
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because of the listed base, including sex — whether male or female. It is hard 
to imagine a court holding that a transgender person is not protected from 
discrimination because of race or religion, yet ironically some courts deny 
such individuals protection from the type of discrimination of which they are 
most likely to be victims. 
Those courts that have focused on whether transsexuals are a protected 
class “have allowed their focus on the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the 
statutory language itself.” Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 2:16-CV-
524, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131474, *45 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016) (quoting 
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306-07 (D.D.C. 2008)). While 
criticizing transgender plaintiffs seeking relief for allegedly trying to create a 
new class of protected individuals, they have actually gone out of their way to 
create a new class of unprotected individuals: “the exclusion of discrimination 
on the basis of transgender identity from the protective scope of Title VII 
would be to take a certain class of gender nonconformity and reclassify it as a 
nonprotected status solely in order to exclude it . . . .” Fabian, 172 F. Supp. 
3d at 523, relying on this Court’s decision in Smith. This carve-out of 
transgender persons from the protections of Title VII “is no longer a tenable 
approach to statutory construction in general,” Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 
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307, nor can it be reconciled with Price Waterhouse, Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 
1201. 
 The question that should be asked in such cases is not whether 
transsexuals persons are covered by Title VII, but — as in every other Title 
VII case — whether the employer has taken “gender into account.” Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239 (“Congress’ intent to forbid 
employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions 
appears on the face of the statute.”) (plurality opinion). If so, the adverse 
employment action of the employer was “because of sex” and violated Title 
VII.   
III. As a Matter of Public Policy and the Logical Continuation of 
 Developing Case Law, This Court Should Hold That 
 Discrimination Because an Individual Is Transsexual Is 
 Discrimination Because of Sex.  
 
The result we advocate for here — a holding that when a transgender 
person is terminated “because of [her] . . .  sex” she is protected under Title 
VII — is correct as a matter of positive law; it is correct because the district 
court erred in its analysis; it is also correct as a matter of policy. To that we 
arrive now.  
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 A. While Discrimination Against Transgender Persons Is Not  
  the Primary Evil Congress Meant to Address in Title   
  VII, Its Language Clearly Includes It. 
 
We begin by conceding that discrimination against transgender persons 
may not have been the primary evil Congress intended to eradicate in 1964, 
when it enacted Title VII. That, however, should not deter this Court from 
arriving at the desired result. The law itself should provide protection against 
such discrimination so long as it is covered by its text. As the Supreme Court 
has noted, regarding another evil now protected by Title VII: 
     As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment 
in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress 
was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principled evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it ultimately the provisions of 
our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed. Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . 
because of . . . sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of 
employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment 
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirement. 
 




The same is true in the case at bar. There is no doubt that when 
an employer decides to terminate a person solely “because of” the 
gender that person chose to adopt, the employer’s decision is “because 
      Case: 16-2424     Document: 62     Filed: 04/26/2017     Page: 28
21 
 
of  . . . sex.” In fact, it would be very hard to explain the decision in any 
other terms: what was it based on, other than “sex” considerations?  
Throughout his testimony, the employer in this case referred to 
Ms. Stephens’s sex. He has done so while referring to Ms. Stephens’s 
alleged violation of the dress code, because of her sex. Opinion & 
Order, R.76, PageID#2192-14. He has done so when asserting that “the 
Bible teaches that a person’s sex is an immutable God-given gift.” Id., 
PageID#2194 (citing employer’s affidavit). Either way, the reasons that 
led the employer in this matter to terminate Ms. Stephens were directly, 
and inexorably, linked to her sex. And this is a quintessential example 
of sex-based discrimination.     
 B.  The Understanding of the Term “Sex” in Title VII Has 
  Evolved Considerably Since 1964. 
 
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en-banc, has recently authored a 
comprehensive opinion regarding Title VII and sexual orientation. See Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Cmty College of Indiana, No. 115-1720, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5839 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2017). 
In Hively, the court held — in a decision described by its own members 
as “momentous,” Id. at *50 (Sykes, J., dissenting) — that “discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination” and therefore 
covered by Title VII.  Id. at *2. 
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Hively discussed in length the evolving understanding of the term “sex” 
in Title VII. Although the case involved sexual orientation discrimination, 
Judge Posner noted that such evolution applies to transgender persons as well: 
discrimination on grounds of “sex” in Title VII received today a 
 new, a broader, meaning. Nothing has changed more in the 
 decades since the enactment of the statutes than attitude towards 
 sex. 1964 was more than a decade before Richard Raskind 
 underwent male-to-female reassignment surgery and took the 
 name Renée Richards, becoming the first transgender celebrity; 
 now of course transgender persons are common. 
 
Id. at *34-35 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 
Moreover, the Hively court observed that “it would require considerable 
calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’” Id. at *24. We 
agree, and observe that it would take a Herculean effort to remove “sex” from 
“sexual identity.”  Thus, to say that to discriminate based on someone’s sexual 
identity is not to discriminate based on sex truly makes no sense.  
 C.  The Employer Cannot Deny Ms. Stephens Her Identity as a  
  Woman.  
 
A third, and perhaps most important, policy consideration in this case 
relates to the treatment (or mistreatment) of Ms. Stephens by her employer. 
The essence of the argument is this: at no point in this case did the employer 
bother to recognize the fact that his employee — here, Ms. Stephens — was 
undergoing a sex transition. He simply ignored the fact that she advised him of 
that change and continued to treat her as a male. For him, Ms. Stephens was 
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simply a man who wished to violate the workplace dress code by dressing like 
a woman.  See Opinion & Order, R.76, PageID#2192 (citing deposition) (“Q: 
“What was the specific reason that you terminated Stephens? A: Well because 
he – he was no longer going to represent himself as a man. He wanted to dress 
as a woman . . . we have a dress code that is very specific that men will dress 
as men . . . and that women will conform to their dress code that we specify.”) 
(emphasis in the original). He denied Ms. Stephens the recognition she 
deserves, as a human being and as a woman. 
Indeed, Ms. Stephens no longer considered herself to be a man. If the 
employer would have bothered to ask which “sex” she identified with, the 
answer would have been clear: female. See id., PageID#2188 (citing 
Stephens’s letter) (“I have felt imprisoned in my body that does not match my 
mind . . . . The first step I must take is to live and work full-time as a woman 
for one year.”) (emphasis in the original). Ms. Stephens’s sexual identity is at 
the core of who she is; simply calling her a “man,” besides completely ignoring 
reality, also denies her the ability to choose her sex. Under Title VII, 
terminating her for these precise reasons constitutes illegal employment 
discrimination. 
  





This case is not difficult.  We respectfully ask this Court to do no more 
than recognize that discrimination against an individual because that person 
is transsexual is by definition discrimination because of sex and is, therefore, 
prohibited by Title VII.  
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